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Human–Robot Interaction challenges Artificial Intelligence in many regards: dynamic, 
partially unknown environments that were not originally designed for robots; a broad 
variety of situations with rich semantics to understand and interpret; physical interactions 
with humans that requires fine, low-latency yet socially acceptable control strategies; 
natural and multi-modal communication which mandates common-sense knowledge and 
the representation of possibly divergent mental models. This article is an attempt to 
characterise these challenges and to exhibit a set of key decisional issues that need to 
be addressed for a cognitive robot to successfully share space and tasks with a human.
We identify first the needed individual and collaborative cognitive skills: geometric 
reasoning and situation assessment based on perspective-taking and affordance analysis; 
acquisition and representation of knowledge models for multiple agents (humans and 
robots, with their specificities); situated, natural and multi-modal dialogue; human-
aware task planning; human–robot joint task achievement. The article discusses each of 
these abilities, presents working implementations, and shows how they combine in a 
coherent and original deliberative architecture for human–robot interaction. Supported 
by experimental results, we eventually show how explicit knowledge management, both 
symbolic and geometric, proves to be instrumental to richer and more natural human–
robot interactions by pushing for pervasive, human-level semantics within the robot’s 
deliberative system.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. The challenge of human–robot interaction
1.1. The human–robot interaction context
Human–Robot Interaction (HRI) represents a challenge for Artificial Intelligence (AI). It lays at the crossroad of many sub-
domains of AI and, in effect, it calls for their integration: modelling humans and human cognition; acquiring, representing, 
manipulating in a tractable way abstract knowledge at the human level; reasoning on this knowledge to make decisions; 
eventually instantiating those decisions into physical actions both legible to and in coordination with humans. Many AI 
techniques are mandated, from visual processing to symbolic reasoning, from task planning to theory of mind building, from 
reactive control to action recognition and learning.
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itoring of the environment and human activity (B). The robot must adapt on-line its behaviours by merging computed plans (C) with reactive control. The 
robot explicitly reasons on the fact that it is (or is not) observed by the human. Reasoning and planning take place at symbolic as well as geometric level 
and take into account agents beliefs, perspectives and capabilities (D) as estimated by the robot.
We do not claim to address here the issue as a whole. This article attempts however to organise it into a coherent 
challenge for Artificial Intelligence, and to explain and illustrate some of the paths that we have investigated on our robots, 
that result in a set of deliberative, knowledge-oriented, software components designed for human–robot interaction.
We focus on a specific class of interactions: human–robot collaborative task achievement [1] supported by multi-modal 
and situated communication. Fig. 1 illustrates this context: the human and the robot share a common space and exchange 
information through multiple modalities (we specifically consider verbal communication, deictic gestures and social gaze), 
and the robot is expected to achieve interactive object manipulation, fetch and carry tasks and other similar chores by 
taking into account, at every stage, the intentions, beliefs, perspectives, skills of its human partner. Namely, the robot 
must be able to recognise, understand and participate in communication situations, both explicit (e.g. the human addresses 
verbally the robot) and implicit (e.g. the human points to an object); the robot must be able to take part in joint actions, 
both pro-actively (by planning and proposing resulting plans to the human) and reactively; the robot must be able to move 
and act in a safe, efficient and legible way, taking into account social rules like proxemics.
These three challenges, communication, joint action, human-aware execution, structure the research in human–robot inter-
action. They can be understood in terms of cognitive skills that they mandate. Joint action, for instance, builds from:
• a joint goal, which has been previously established and agreed upon (typically through dialogue);
• a physical environment, estimated through the robot’s exteroceptive sensing capabilities, and augmented by inferences 
drawn from previous observations;
• a belief state that includes a priori common-sense knowledge and mental models of each of the agents involved (the 
robot and its human partners).
The robot controller (with the help of a task planner) decides what action to execute next [2], and who should perform it, 
from the robot or the human (or both in case of a collaborative action such as a handover [3,4]), how it should achieved and 
what signals should be sensed and/or produced by the robot to facilitate human–robot joint action [5–8]. It finally controls 
and monitors its execution. The operation continues until the goal is achieved, is declared unachievable or is abandoned by 
the human [9].
This translates into several decisional, planning, representation skills that need to be available to the robot [10]. It must 
be able: 1 to represent and manipulate symbolic belief states, 2 to acquire and keep them up-to-date with respect to the 
state of the world and the task at hand, 3 to build and iteratively refine shared (human–robot) plans, 4 to instantiate and 
execute the actions it has to perform, and conversely, to monitor those achieved by its human partner.
Besides, such abilities should be designed and implemented in a task-independent manner, and should provide sufficient 
levels of parametrisation, so that they adapt to various environments, different tasks and variable levels of engagement of 
the robot, ranging from teammate behaviour to assistant or pro-active helper.
These are the challenges that we will discuss in this article.
1.2. Contribution and article overview
Our main contributions focus on the architecture of the decisional layer of social robots. Specifically, the deliberative 
architecture of a robot designed to share space and tasks with humans, and to act and interact in a way that supports the 
human’s own actions and decisions. We present hereafter a model of cognitive integration for service robots that:
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and yet loosely-coupled fashion;
• achieves multi-modal and interactive symbol grounding [11] in complex, real-world environments involving one or 
several humans and a robot;
• distributes the computation of symbolic knowledge by combining perspective taking, affordances computation, situated 
dialogue and logical inference;
• provides generic mechanisms for the robot to reason about the mental state of its human partners;
• reuses the same set of affordances and inferences, together with explicit contextual reasoning on humans and robot 
abilities, to generate human–robot shared plans.
This architecture is fully implemented and we demonstrate it on several robotic platforms and in several interaction 
scenarios. It eventually proves to be an effective framework for novel contributions about human–robot joint action [12–14], 
as well as for multi-disciplinary studies [15–20].
The remaining of the article details this robotic architecture. We organise this discussion in five sections. The next section 
introduces the architecture as a whole, as well as the knowledge model that we have developed for our robots. Section 3
discusses each of the cognitive components of the architecture. Section 4 presents two studies that illustrate in a practical 
way what can be currently achieved with our robots. The Sections 5 and 6 finally summarise our main contributions and 
restate the key challenges that human–robot interaction brings to Artificial Intelligence.
2. Deliberative architecture and knowledge model
2.1. Building a human-aware deliberative layer
Articulating multiple independent software modules in one coherent robotic architecture is not only a technical challenge, 
but also a design and architectural challenge. In particular, properly managing the rich semantics of natural interactions with 
humans raises a range of issues. Our basic assumption and guiding principle is that human-level interaction is easier to 
achieve if the robot itself relies internally on human-level semantics. We implement this principle by extensively relying on 
explicit knowledge representation and manipulation: software components communicate with each other using first-order 
logic statements organised into ontologies and whose semantics are close to the ones manipulated by humans.
Fig. 2 gives an overview of our architecture. An active knowledge base (Oro), conveniently thought as a semantic 
blackboard, connects most of the modules: the geometric reasoning module (Spark) produces at relatively high frequency 
symbolic assertions describing the state of the robot environment and its evolution over time. These logical statements are 
stored in the knowledge base, and queried back, when necessary, by the language processing module (Dialogs), the sym-
bolic task planner (HATP) and the execution controller (Shary or pyRobots). The output of the language processing module 
and the activities managed by the robot controller are stored back as symbolic statements as well.
For instance, a book laying on a furniture might be picked up by Spark and represented in symbolic terms as 〈BOOK1 
type Book, BOOK1 isOn TABLE〉. These symbolic statements are stored in the knowledge base Oro and made available to the 
other cognitive modules. Later, the robot might process a sentence like “give me another book”. The Dialogs module would 
then query the knowledge base: find(?obj type Book, ?obj differentFrom BOOK1), and write back assertions like 〈HUMAN 
desires GIVE_ACTION45, GIVE_ACTION45 actsOn BOOK2〉 to Oro. This would in turn trigger the execution controller Shary to 
prepare to act. It would first call the HATP planner. The planner uses the knowledge base to initialise the planning domain 
(e.g. find(BOOK2 isAt ?location)), and returns a full symbolic plan to the execution controller. Finally, the controller would 
execute the plan and monitor its achievement, both for itself and for the human. We present complete examples of similar 
interactions in Section 4.
Our architecture has not been designed to replicate or provide a plausible model of human cognition, and in this sense, 
we distinguish ourselves from research on cognitive architectures. Instead, our main design principle is to nurture the deci-
sional components of the robot with models of human behaviour and human preferences in order to develop an effective 
artificial cognition for a robot that is able to serve and interact seamlessly with humans. In this sense, it shares its objectives 
with [21,22].
At high level, this architecture relies on the same principles as a number of known robotic layered architectures [23–26]. 
However, the main point for us was to refine and study in detail the internals of the deliberative layer. In our model, we 
suggest that the interactions between components within this deliberative level have to be essentially bidirectional. We 
also suggest not to introduce any sub-layers of abstraction amongst these deliberative components.1 The natural language 
processing component illustrates this structure: instead of being an independent input modality whose outputs would be 
unidirectionally fed to “higher” decisional components, it lives in the deliberative space at the same level as other delibera-
tive components, and make use of the knowledge base in a bidirectional manner, to interpret, disambiguate natural language, 
and eventually store newly produced interpretations (natural language processing is discussed in Section 3.3). Another ex-
1 We must clarify that we do have lower-level modules to execute actions or manage sensors, but all cognition-related modules live in the same global 
deliberative space.
48 S. Lemaignan et al. / Artificial Intelligence 247 (2017) 45–69Fig. 2. Overview of the architecture. A deliberative layer, composed of six main modules, interacts with a low-level sensori-motor layer. Knowledge is 
centrally managed in an active semantic blackboard, pictured above with a thick border. The links between components depicted on the figure underline the 
central role of the knowledge base: many of the data streams are actually symbolic statements exchanged through this semantic blackboard.
ample is the intricate relation between high-level symbolic planning and geometric planning to deal with affordances and 
human preferences.
Our architecture relates to Beliefs, Desires, Intentions (BDI) architectures. As put by Woolridge [27], BDI architectures are 
primarily focused on practical reasoning, i.e. the process of deciding, step by step, which action to perform to reach a goal. 
The management of the interaction between knowledge (the beliefs) and task and plan representation and execution (the 
desires and the intentions) is central, and aims at selecting at each step the best sub-goal. It becomes then an intention that 
the robot commits to. As for any cognitive system, this fundamental interaction between knowledge and actions is central to 
our approach as well, and typically involves the dialogue module to acquire desires from the other agents, and the planner 
and the execution controller to first decide to take into account (or not) an incoming desire as a goal, and then to generate 
and manage intentions from these goals through the symbolic task planner.
We extend upon BDI architectures by running other background deliberative tasks, without them being explicitly trig-
gered by desires in the BDI sense. The main ones include situation assessment, action monitoring and processing of 
non-imperative speech (including performative dialogue that can possibly change the internal state of the robot, but does 
not lead directly to the creation of desires, like assertion of new facts or question answering).
2.2. Knowledge model
In our architecture, knowledge manipulation relies on a central server (the Oro server [28], Fig. 5 top) which stores 
knowledge as it is produced by each of the other deliberative components (the clients). It exposes a json-based RPC API 
to query the knowledge base [29]. We represent knowledge as RDF triples in the OWL sub-language.2 Every time triples are 
added or removed from the knowledge base, a Description Logics reasoner (Pellet [30]) classifies the whole ontology and 
inserts all possible inferred triples. The clients of the Oro server are in charge of managing themselves the knowledge (when 
to add, when to update, when to retract knowledge) as no meta-semantics are carried over that let the server manage itself 
these dynamics.3
This architecture design (a central knowledge base that essentially appears as a passive component to the rest of the 
system – even though it actually actively processes the knowledge pool in the background to perform inferences) departs 
2 http :/ /www.w3 .org /TR /owl2-overview/.
3 With one exception: so-called memory profiles let the server automatically discard facts (i.e. forget about them) after a specific period of time. We 
present this feature in section 3.1.3.
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CRAM/KnowRob architecture [32] where the knowledge base is an active hub that pro-actively queries perceptual compo-
nents to acquire knowledge. We believe that our design leads to a good observability (knowledge flows are explicit and easy 
to capture since they are centralised) as well as high modularity (modules communicate through an explicit and unified API).
At run-time, the knowledge available to the robot comes from three sources. A priori knowledge is stored in an ontology 
(the OpenRobots ontology, discussed hereafter) and is loaded at start-up. This static source implements the common-sense
knowledge of the robot, and might optionally include scenario-specific knowledge (for instance, about objects that are to be 
manipulated). The second part of the knowledge is acquired at run-time from perception, interaction and planning. The next 
sections go into details of these processes. The third source of symbolic statements comes from the inferences produced by 
the reasoner.
Contrary to similar projects like KnowRob [33] that relies on the concept of computables to lazily evaluate/acquire sym-
bolic facts when needed, we have an explicit approach where we greedily compute and assert symbolic statements (like 
spatial relations between objects, see Section 3.2). For instance, whenever a client queries KnowRob to know if 〈OBJECT1 
isOn OBJECT2〉, KnowRob calls a geometric reasoner to evaluate if this specific spatial relation holds at that point in time. 
With our approach, spatial relations are instead computed and asserted a priori by a dedicated process that continuously 
runs in the background. This design choice trades scalability for explicit reasoning: at any time, the full belief state is made 
explicit, and therefore provides the reasoner with the largest possible inference domain. This is of special importance for an 
event-based architecture like ours (see Section 3.5), where an explicit and comprehensive belief state is required to not miss 
events.
2.2.1. RDF as a formalism for semantics
The Oro server relies on Description Logics (OWL) to represent and manipulate knowledge. Relying on RDF triples and 
Description Logics has advantages such as good understanding of its trades-off, thanks to being widespread in the semantic 
Web community; the availability of mature libraries to manipulate the ontology; interoperability with several major on-line 
knowledge bases (OpenCyc, WordNet, DBPedia or RoboEarth [34] for examples); open-world reasoning (which enables us 
to represent that some facts might be unknown to the robot); and the formal guarantee of decidability (it is always possible 
to classify a Description Logics ontology).
It also has restrictions, both basic (the suitability of Description Logics when reasoning on – typically non-monotonic – 
commonsense knowledge has been questioned) and practical: RDF triples imply binary predicates, which constrains the 
expressiveness of the system or leads to inconvenient reifications. Alternatives have been proposed (like KnowRob [33]) 
that interleave RDF with more expressive logic languages like Prolog with however other limitations, like closed-world 
reasoning.
Classification performance is another issue: in our experience, an ontology sized for a typical study (about 100 classes 
and 200 instances), classification takes around 100 ms, which may introduce perceptible delays during interactions. Besides, 
the performances are difficult to predict: the insertion of seemingly simple statements may change abruptly the logical 
complexity of the knowledge model and lead to a noticeable degradation of classification time.
This knowledge model also largely excludes representation of continuous phenomena (like time) or uncertain phenom-
ena. When required (for instance for action recognition), these are managed within dedicated components (like Spark, 
discussed in Section 3.2), and are not represented in the knowledge base.
Alternative formalisms have been successfully investigated in robotics to address some of these restrictions. Besides the 
Prolog/OWL combination relied upon by KnowRob, Answer Set Programming has been used in robotics [35,36] for instance 
to better supports non-monotonic reasoning. We have also pointed in [37] how modal logics like the epistemic logics could 
be relevant to the particular field of social human–robot interaction as they allow for the representation of alternative 
mental models. First-order logic and OWL ontologies have however proved so far a simple, effective and sufficient symbolic 
framework for our experimental applications.
Incidentally, and because ontologies and RDF statements remain conceptually simple (compared to full logical languages 
like Prolog or modal logics), their adoption has also effectively helped to grow awareness amongst colleagues on the 
significance of the “semantic level” when developing new components for the robot.
2.2.2. The OpenRobots ontology
As previously mentioned, the logical statements exchanged between the deliberative components are organised within 
the Oro knowledge base into an ontology. The conceptualisation (i.e. the system of concepts or TBox) of this ontology is 
statically asserted,4 while the instantiation (the ABox) of the ontology is generally dynamically asserted at run-time, by the 
other cognitive components.
The OpenRobots common-sense ontology represents the statically asserted part of the ontology. It has been designed from 
two requirements: being practical (i.e. covering our experimental needs) and conforming as much as possible to existing 
standards (specifically, the OpenCyc upper ontology [38]).
4 It can however be altered at runtime, see the “Cat” example in Section 3.3.1.
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other through ‘is-a’ subsumption relations.
This leads to a bidirectional design process: from bottom-up regarding the choices of concepts to model, top-down re-
garding the upper part of the conceptualisation. This upper part of the ontology is pictured in Fig. 3. All the classes visible 
in this figure belong to the OpenCyc namespace.
Aligning the upper part of the ontology on OpenCyc (as done by other knowledge representation systems, like
KnowRob [33] or PEIS K&R [39]) has multiple advantages. First the design of this part of the ontology is generally difficult: 
it pertains to abstract concepts whose mutual relations comes to philosophical debates. The upper taxonomy of OpenCyc
represents a relative consensus, at least within the semantic Web community. Then, because it is a well established project 
with numerous links to other on-line databases (like Wikipedia or WordNet), the reuse of key OpenCyc concepts ensures 
that the knowledge stored by the robot can be shared or extended with well-defined semantics. The concept of Object is a 
good example as it represents a typical case of ambiguous meaning: in everyday conversation, an object is a relatively small 
physical thing, that can be usually manipulated. A human is not usually considered as an object. OpenCyc however precisely 
defines an object as anything at least partially tangible. This includes obviously the humans, and actually many other entities 
that would not be commonly said to be objects (the Earth for instance). By relying on well-defined and standard semantics 
to exchange information between artificial systems, we avoid semantic ambiguities. As the robot interacts with humans, we 
must however address the discrepancy between OpenCyc concepts and human terminology. In these situations, we manu-
ally label the OpenCyc concepts with appropriate human names: for instance, the OpenRobots Ontology associates the label 
“object” to the concept cyc:Artifact instead of the concept cyc:PartiallyTangible. These labels are used in priority 
during the grounding of verbal interactions.
Fig. 3 also illustrates the fundamental disjunction in the Oro model between temporal and spatial entities (formally, 
(TemporalThing  SpatialThing)I = ∅, with I the interpretation of our model).
On this same figure, the class PurposefulAction represents the superset of all the actions that are purposefully per-
formed by the robot (or another agent). Actual actions (i.e. subclasses of PurposefulAction like Give or LookAt) are not 
initially asserted in the common-sense ontology. They are instead added at run-time by the execution controller (in link 
with the symbolic task planner) and the natural language processor based on what the robot is actually able to perform 
and/or to interpret in the current context (i.e. the current robot configuration and the actions required by the scenario). The 
set of actions that the robot can interpret usually closely resemble the planning domain in use (i.e. the set of tasks known 
to the symbolic task planner, with their corresponding pre- and post-conditions).
The tree5 in Fig. 3 is not equally developed in every directions. For example, the subclasses of Partially-
TangibleThing (i.e. what we commonly call objects) are shown in Fig. 4. Our ‘bottom-up” design process of the ontology 
is apparent on this figure: only the subclasses relevant to the context of service robotics in an human-like environment 
are asserted: For performance reasons as well as clarity, we have decided against an extended conceptual coverage of what 
“partially tangible things” might be. We instead opportunistically extend the common-sense knowledge when required by 
studies.
Lastly, the Oro common-sense ontology contains several rules and class expressions that encode non-trivial inferences. 
The definition of Bottle as found in the Oro ontology is a typical example:
Bottle≡ Container∧ GraspableObject∧ hasShape ∈ CylinderShapeI
∧ hasMainDimension ∈ [0.1,0.3]
5 While this subset of the ontology is a tree, it does not generally have to be the case. In particular, the concept system (the TBox) of the Oro common-
sense ontology does not form a tree.
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If a human informs the robot that a given object is indeed a bottle, the robot can consequently derive more information 
on the object. Conversely, if the human affirms that “a car is a bottle”, the reasoner may detect logical contradictions (like 
inconsistent sizes) and reject the assertion. The Dialogs module relies on such logical consistency checks when processing 
natural language inputs, both to ensure that the verbal input has been correctly acquired and parsed, and also to verify that 
what the human says is logically consistent.
We further discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this knowledge framework in Section 5.4.
2.3. Symbol grounding
Grounding (also called anchoring when specifically referring to the building of links between percepts and physical ob-
jects [40]) is the task consisting in building and maintaining a bi-directional link between sub-symbolic representations 
(sensors data, low-level actuation) and symbolic representations that can be manipulated and reasoned about [11]. This 
represents an important cognitive skill, in particular in the human–robot interaction context: in this situation, the link that 
the robot has to establish between percepts and symbols must map as well as possible to the human representations in 
order to effectively support communication.
Symbol grounding connects hence the knowledge model to the perception and actuation capabilities of the robot. The 
different components that we have mentioned so far exhibit grounding mechanisms: geometric reasoning and dialogue 
processing modules constantly build and push new symbolic contents about the world to the knowledge base. We detail 
this process in the next sections.
3. Cognitive skills
The previous section has introduced the integration model of our architecture, as well as the associated knowledge 
model. We discuss in this section each of its building blocks. They are pictured in Fig. 2, along with their connections to the 
others components.
We call cognitive skills the deliberative behaviours that are 1 stateful, i.e. keeping track of previous states is typically 
needed for the component to perform appropriately; 2 amodal in that the skill is not inherently bound to a specific percep-
tion or actuation modality; 3 manipulate explicit semantics, typically by the mean of symbolic reasoning; 4 operate at the 
human-level, i.e. are legible to the humans, typically by acting at similar levels of abstraction.
We present first the main internal cognitive capabilities, implemented in the Oro knowledge base itself, and then dis-
cuss successively the situation assessment module Spark, the dialogue processor Dialogs, the symbolic task planner HATP, 
and finally the main features of our execution controllers Shary and pyRobots. Note that greater details on each of these 
modules can be found in their respective publications (the corresponding references are provided hereafter).
3.1. Internal cognitive skills
We call internal those cognitive capabilities that are tightly bound to the knowledge model, and hence implemented 
directly within the Oro server. We present here three of them: reasoning, theory of mind modelling and our (naive) approach 
to memory management.
3.1.1. Symbolic reasoning
As mentioned in the previous section, we use the Pellet open-source reasoner to reason on the knowledge base. It 
supports several standard inference mechanisms: consistency checking, concept satisfiability, classification and realisation 
(computation of the most specific classes that a concept belongs to). In case of logical inconsistency, the reasoner can also 
provide explanations (we currently only use them for debugging purposes).
52 S. Lemaignan et al. / Artificial Intelligence 247 (2017) 45–69Besides, Oro server implements several algorithms (presented in [17]) to identify similarities and differences between 
concepts (classes or instances): the Common Ancestors algorithm, useful to determine the most specific class(es) that include 
a given set of individuals; the First Different Ancestors algorithm that returns what can be intuitively understood as the 
most generic types that differentiate two concepts; and clarification and discrimination algorithms that play a key role in 
the process of interactive grounding of the semantics of concepts (we discuss this process in section 3.3). Clarification and 
discrimination algorithms are based on what we call descriptors, i.e. properties of individuals, either statically asserted in 
the common-sense ontology, acquired by the robot through perception or pro-active questioning of the human partner, 
or derived from other reasoning algorithms like the Common Ancestors and Different Ancestors. The discrimination algorithm 
consists then in looking for discriminants, i.e. descriptors that allow a maximum discrimination among a set of individuals.
3.1.2. Theory of mind
Theory of Mind (originally defined in [41]) is the cognitive ability that allows a subject to represent the mental state of 
another agent, possibly including knowledge that contradicts the subject’s own model: for example, a book can be at the 
same time visible for agent A, and not visible for agent B. Children develop this skill, which is essential to understand others’ 
perspectives during interactions, around the age of three [42].
From the point of view of interactive robotics, it supposes the robot ability to build, store and retrieve separate models 
of the beliefs of the humans it interacts with. Our knowledge base implements such a mechanism [28]: when the robot 
detects that a new human has appeared, it initialises a new independent knowledge model (an ontology) for this human 
agent. All the ontologies that are created share the same common-sense knowledge, but rely on the estimation of the robot 
of each agent’s perspective for their actual instantiation. For example, the robot can (geometrically) compute that a given 
book is in its own field of view, but not in the human one (the detail of this computation, called perspective taking, is 
discussed in the next section). The robot updates accordingly the two knowledge models it maintains: the robot model 
is updated with the fact 〈BOOK isVisible true〉, while the human model is updated with 〈BOOK isVisible false〉. These 
two logical statements are simultaneously asserted, yet contradict when taken together. Since the two knowledge models 
are however implemented as two independent ontologies, the contradiction does not actually appear and both the models 
remain logically consistent.
One classical application of this cognitive skill is the so-called False-Belief experiment (also known as the Sally and Anne
experiment, introduced by [43] from an original experimental setting by [44]): a child is asked to watch a scene where two 
people, A and B, manipulate objects. At some point, A leaves and B hides away one object. When A comes back, we ask the 
child “where do you think A will look for the object?”. Before acquiring a theory of mind, children are not able to separate 
their own (true) model of the world (where they know that the object was hidden) from the model of A, which contains 
false beliefs on the world (A still thinks the object is at its original position since he did not see B hiding it in a new place). 
Relying on these separate knowledge models in the knowledge base, we have been able to replicate this experience with 
our robots [45], in a manner similar to Breazeal et al. [46].
3.1.3. Working memory
Memory has been studied at length in the cognitive psychology and neuro-psychology communities: the idea of short-
term and long-term memory is due to Atkinson and Shiffrin [47]; Anderson [48] proposes to split memory into declarative
(explicit) and procedural (implicit) memories; Tulving [49] organises the concepts of procedural, semantic and episodic mem-
ories into a hierarchy. Short-term memory is eventually refined with the concept of working memory by Baddeley [50]. In 
the field of cognitive architectures, the Soar architecture [51] is one of those that try to reproduce a human-like mem-
ory organisation. The GLAIR cognitive architecture [52] also has a concept of long term/short term and episodic/semantic 
memories.
It is worth emphasising that while memory is commonly associated with the process of forgetting facts after a variable 
amount of time, it actually covers more mechanisms that are relevant to robotics, like priming (concept pre-activation 
triggered by a specific context [53]) or reinforcement learning.
The Oro server features a mechanism to mimic only minimalistic forms of memory families. When new statements are 
inserted in the knowledge base, a memory profile is attached to them. Three such profiles are predefined: short term, episodic
and long term. They are currently attached to different lifetime for the statements (respectively 10 seconds, 5 minutes and 
no time limit). After this duration, the statements are automatically removed.
This approach is limited. In particular, episodic memory should primarily refer to the semantics of the statements (that 
is expected to be related to an event) and not to a specific lifespan.
We rely however on this mechanism in certain cases: some modules like the natural language processor use the short 
term memory profile to mark concepts that are currently manipulated by the robot as active concepts: if a human asks 
the robot “Give me all red objects”, the human, the Give action, and every red objects that are found are marked as 
active concepts by inserting statements such as 〈HUMAN type ActiveConcept〉 in the short-term memory (which can be 
considered, in this case, to be a working memory). Likewise, recently seen or updated geometric entities are flagged as
ActiveConcept. We use this feature during dialogue disambiguation to access concepts recently referred to. On the other 
hand, our perception layer does not make use of this mechanism. As described in the next section, the environment model 
of the robot is continuously updated and the derived symbolic knowledge is therefore transient: it lasts only as long as the 
environment remains in the same state.
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Fig. 6. Test setup involving videotapes boxes that are manipulated, with other objects acting as supports or containers. After identification and localisation 
of the set of objects (using fiducial markers) and acquisition of the position and posture of the human partner (using skeleton tracking), the robot is able 
to compute that two tapes only are reachable by itself: the black and grey (in the 3D model) tapes. The third tape and the container box are only reachable 
by the human. This physical situation is transformed by Spark into the set of facts presented in Table 1.
3.2. Acquiring and anchoring knowledge in the physical world
Anchoring perceptions in a symbolic model requires perception abilities and their symbolic interpretation. We call phys-
ical situation assessment the cognitive skill that a robot exhibits when it assesses the nature and content of its surroundings 
and monitors its evolution.
Numerous approaches exist, like amodal (in the sense of modality-independent) proxies [54], grounded amodal represen-
tations [55], semantic maps [56–58] or affordance-based planning and object classification [59,60].
We rely on a dedicated geometric and temporal reasoning module called Spark (SPAtial Reasoning & Knowledge, presented 
in [61]). It acts as a situation assessment reasoner that generates symbolic knowledge from the geometry of the environ-
ment with respect to relations between objects, robots and humans (Figs. 5 and 6), also taking into account the different 
perspective that each agent has on the environment. Spark embeds an amodal (as defined by Mavridis and Roy in [55]: the 
different perceptual modalities are abstracted away into a blended spatial model) geometric model of the environment that 
serves both as basis for the fusion of the perception modalities and as bridge with the symbolic layer. This geometric model 
is built from 3D CAD models of the objects, furnitures and robots, and full body, rigged models of humans (Fig. 6(b)). It is 
updated at run-time by the robot’s sensors (usually, a combination of vision-based tracking of 2D fiducial markers to iden-
tify and localise objects, and Kinect-based skeleton tracking of humans, optionally assisted by motion capture to accurately 
track the head motion, which is required to compute what the human is looking at).
Spark runs and continuously updates the knowledge base at about 10 Hz. At each step, it re-computes spatial relations 
and affordances for the whole scene, and send the delta (new relations and relations that do not hold anymore) to the 
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Symbolic facts computed from the situation depicted in Fig. 6. Note how reachability differs for the two agents.
Robot’s beliefs about itself (robot’s model)
〈PINK_BOX isReachable false〉
〈WHITE_TAPE isReachable false〉
〈BLACK_TAPE isReachable true〉
〈GREY_TAPE isReachable true〉
〈WHITE_TAPE isVisible true〉
〈BLACK_TAPE isVisible true〉
〈GREY_TAPE isVisible true〉
〈WHITE_TAPE isOn TABLE〉
〈BLACK_TAPE isOn TABLE〉
〈GREY_TAPE isOn TABLE〉
Robot’s beliefs about the human (human’s model)
〈PINK_BOX isReachable true〉
〈WHITE_TAPE isReachable true〉
〈BLACK_TAPE isReachable false〉
〈GREY_TAPE isReachable false〉
〈WHITE_TAPE isVisible true〉
〈BLACK_TAPE isVisible true〉
〈GREY_TAPE isVisible true〉
〈WHITE_TAPE isOn TABLE〉
〈BLACK_TAPE isOn TABLE〉
〈GREY_TAPE isOn TABLE〉
knowledge base. This approach may raise scalability concerns (we did not however observed performance issues in our 
constrained scenarios, involving typically about 10 objects and two agents) as well as prevent reasoning on the situation 
history, but simplifies the management of the dynamics of the knowledge (When do I discard outdated knowledge? When do I 
update it?). Since it is equivalent to a reset of the reasoner domain, it also essentially nullifies issues linked to non-monotonic 
reasoning in the knowledge base (see [62] for a discussion on that question).
3.2.1. Building an agent-aware symbolic model of the environment
Perspective taking. Visual perspective taking refers to the ability for visually perceiving the environment from another person’s 
point of view. This ability allows us to properly handle and represent situations where the visual perception of one person 
differs from the other one. A typical example found in developmental psychology consists of two similar objects in a room 
(e.g. two balls) that are both visible for a child, but only one is visible to the adult. When the adult requests the child to 
hand over “the ball”, the child is able to correctly identify which ball the adult is referring to (i.e. the one visible from the 
adult point of view), without asking [63]. Our architecture endows the robot with such a cognitive skill.
Spatial perspective taking refers to the qualitative spatial location of objects (or agents) with respect to a frame (e.g. 
the keys on my left). Based on this frame of reference, the description of an object varies [64]. Humans mix perspectives 
frequently during interaction. This is more effective than maintaining a consistent one, either because the (cognitive) cost 
of switching is lower than remaining with the same perspective, or if the cost is about the same, because the spatial 
situation may be more easily described from one perspective rather than another [65]. Ambiguities arise when one speaker 
refers to an object within a reference system (or changes the reference system, i.e. switches perspective) without informing 
her partner about it [66,67]. For example, the speaker could ask for the “keys on the left”. Since no reference system 
has been given, the listener would not know where exactly to look. However, asking for “the keys on your left” gives 
enough information to the listener to understand where the speaker is referring to. On the contrary, when using an exact, 
unambiguous term of reference to describe a location (e.g.. “go north”) no ambiguity arises. In Spark, agent-dependent 
spatial relations are computed from the frame of reference of each agent.
Symbolic locations. Humans commonly refer to the positions of objects with symbolic descriptors (like on, next to...) instead 
of precise, absolute positions (qualitative spatial reasoning). These type of descriptors have been extensively studied in 
the context of language grounding [68–72]. Spark distinguishes between agent-independent symbolic locations (allocentric 
spatial relations) and agent-dependent, relative locations (egocentric spatial relations).
Spark computes three main agent-independent relations based on the bounding box and centre of mass of the objects 
(Fig. 5(a), [61]): isOn holds when an object O 1 is on another object O 2, and is computed by evaluating the centre of 
mass of O 1 according to the bounding box of O 2. isIn evaluates if an object O 1 is inside another object O 2 based on 
their bounding boxes BBO1 and BBO2 . isNextTo indicates whether an object O 1 is next to another object O 2. Note that 
we do not use a simple distance threshold to determine if two objects are next to each other since the relation is highly 
dependent on the dimensions of the objects. For instance, the maximum distance between large objects (e.g. two houses) 
to consider them as being next to each other is much larger than the maximum distance we would consider for two small 
objects (e.g. two bottles). Thus, the distance threshold is scaled with the objects’ size. Finally, Spark also computes symbolic 
facts related to agent independent world dynamics. The predicate isMoving states, for each tracked entity, whether it is 
currently moving or not.
Many other topological relations are dependent from the observation point (egocentric perspective). The predicate
hasRelativePosition represents the superset of such spatial relations between agents and objects that are agent-
dependent. We compute these spatial relations by dividing the space around the referent (an agent) into n regions based on 
arbitrary angle values relative to the referent orientation (Fig. 5(b)). For example, for n = 4 we would have the space divided 
into front, left, right and back. Additionally, two proximity values, near and far, are also considered. The number of regions 
and proximity values can be chosen depending on the context where the interaction takes place. Through perspective taking,
Spark computes for each agent a symbolic description of the relative positioning of objects in the environment.
Table 2 summarises all the symbolic spatial relations computed by Spark.
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List of statements describing agent-independent spatial relationships between objects (top), agent-dependent placements (middle), and attentional states 
and abilities of agents (bottom). “→” indicates sub-properties. Where existing, the equivalent predicate in the OpenCyc standard (prefix cyc:) is specified. 
Note that some relationships are not computed by Spark, but are instead inferred by the reasoner.
Subject Predicate Object Notes
Location isAt ≡ cyc:objectFoundInLocation Location
→ isOn ≡ cyc:above_ Touching
→ isIn
→ isNextTo
Location isAbove ≡ cyc:above-Generally Location inverse of isBelow isOn ⇒ isAbove
Location isBelow Location inverse of isAbove
Location hasRelativePosition Location
→ behind ≡ cyc:behind-Generally inverse of inFrontOf
→ inFrontOf ≡ cyc:inFrontOf-Generally inverse of behind
→ leftOf inverse of rightOf
→ rightOf inverse of leftOf
Object cyc:farFrom Agent
Object cyc:near Agent
Agent looksAt SpatialThing
Agent sees SpatialThing
SpatialThing isInFieldOfView xsd:boolean myself sees * ⇔ * isInFieldOfView true
Agent pointsAt ≡ cyc:pointingToward SpatialThing
Agent focusesOn SpatialThing looksAt ∧ pointsAt ⇔ focusesOn
Agent seesWithHeadMovement SpatialThing
Agent canReach Object
Object isReachable xsd:boolean myself canReach * ⇔ * isReachable true
3.2.2. Building a model of agents
Building a grounded symbolic model of the physical environment does not suffice in general to fully ground the human–
robot interaction, and a model of the current capabilities of the agents interacting with the robot is also required.
Spark computes the following capabilities from the perspectives of each agent:
• Sees: this relation describes what the agent can see, i.e. what is within its field of view (FOV). In our current implemen-
tation, this affordance is computed by dynamically placing an OpenGL camera at the location of the eyes and running 
occlusion checks from it. In Fig. 5(c) the field of view of a person is illustrated with a grey cone (the wider one). While 
she is able to see the two small boxes on the table in front of her, the big box on her right is out of her FOV, and 
therefore, she is not able to see it.
Besides, Spark also computes the seesWithHeadMovement relation by simulating a small left-right rotation of the head. 
It represents what an agent could see with a minimal effort.
• Looks At: this relation corresponds to what the agent is focused on, i.e. where its focus of attention is directed. This 
model is based on a narrower field of view, the field of attention (FOA). Fig. 5(c) shows the field of attention of a 
person with a green cone (the narrower one). In this example only the grey box satisfies the looksAt relation.
• Points At holds when an object is pointed at by an agent. This relation is computed by placing a virtual camera on the 
hand, aligned with the forearm. pointsAt is typically used during dialogue grounding, for instance when one of the 
agents is referring to an object saying “this” or “that” while pointing at it.
We apply an hysteresis filter at the geometric level to ensure a sufficiently stable recognition of these three capabilities.
• Reachable enables the robot to estimate the agent’s ability to reach for an object, which is instrumental for effective 
social task planning. For example, if the human asks the robot to give her an object, the robot must compute a transfer 
point where she is able to get the object afterwards. Reachability is computed for each agent (human or robot) based on 
Generalised Inverse Kinematics and collision detection. Besides, the robot is able to compute an estimate of the effort 
needed by an agent to reach an object [73].
Table 2 also lists these abilities, along with the admissible classes for the subjects and objects of the statements.
3.2.3. Primitive action recognition
Monitoring human activity is needed by the execution controllers to track the engagement of the human and the progress 
of their actions. It is also needed to synchronise seamlessly its own actions with the human actions. Full human action 
and activity recognition is a task that requires knowledge and reasoning both on high-level facts like goals, intentions 
and plans, as well as bottom-up data from human and object motions. Spark implements a set of simple temporal and 
geometric heuristics on human hand trajectories and possible objects placements to recognise simple elementary actions. 
Those primitive actions are assessed by monitoring situations like “an empty hand is close to an object on a table” (precursor 
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〈BOOK1 type Book〉 HUMAN1 says: find(?obj type Book) 〈HUMAN1 desires SITUATION1〉
〈HUMAN1 type Human〉 “Give me the book” ⇒ ?obj = BOOK1 〈SITUATION1 type Give〉
〈SITUATION1 performedBy myself〉
〈SITUATION1 actsOnObject BOOK1〉
Fig. 7. Processing of a simple, non-ambiguous command, taken from [74]. Thematic roles (performedBy, actsOnObject, receivedBy) are automat-
ically extracted by Dialogs from the imperative sentence “Give me the book.” The resulting statements (right column) are added to the knowledge base, 
and may eventually trigger an event in the execution controller (see Section 3.5.1).
for a pick), or “a hand holding an object is over a container” (precursor for a put). Spark recognises a set of such primitives. 
When combined with the other geometric computations and a predictive plan of the human actions (see Section 3.4), the 
execution controller can track the fulfilment of the pre- and post-conditions of the predicted human actions. The robot 
relies on these to monitor the engagement of the human and the overall progress of the human–robot shared plan.
3.2.4. Limitations
In its current form, our situation assessment module makes two assumptions: the objects are known in advance (hence, 
we can rely on proper 3D CAD model for spatial reasoning) and the robot benefits of an nearly perfect perception, made 
possible by the use of fiducial markers. Each object receives a unique tag which enables an accurate localisation in 3D and 
prevents recognition ambiguities that would be otherwise reflected in the knowledge base. While Spark algorithms do not 
concern themselves with the nature of the input sources, and would work equally well with a full object recognition stack, 
we did not investigate this research area so far.
Additionally, temporal reasoning (essential for accurate action recognition for instance) is not generally addressed in the 
current state of our system. Temporal reasoning is used only locally, and does not allow for tracking of long sequences or 
global events.
3.3. Multi-modal communication and situated dialogue
3.3.1. Natural language grounding
Natural language is a basic interaction modality that we use in our system both as an input (processing of the human 
speech) and as an output (verbalisation of the robot intentions, as well as human–robot shared plans). Natural language 
processing is facilitated as our architecture manipulates semantics that are close to the human level. This section presents 
the main features of our speech processor, Dialogs, that include semantic and multi-modal grounding, and interactive 
disambiguation. Algorithms and implementation details are provided in [74].
We acquire natural speech input from the human participants through a custom Android-based interface. The interface 
relies on the Google speech recognition API for speech-to-text (ASR) and relays the textual transcript to the robot. The text 
is parsed into a grammatical structure (Part of Speech tagging) by a custom heuristics-based parser. The resulting atoms are 
then resolved with the help of the knowledge base to ground concepts like objects (i.e. when a user says “pick up the can”, 
it resolves to which instance of Can the user is referring to) and actions. Fig. 7 gives an example of the processing of a 
simple, non-ambiguous command. The first study (Section 4.1) walks through more complex examples. Heuristics, like the 
presence of a question mark or the use of imperative mood, are used to classify the sentences into questions, desires or 
statements. Dialogs processes these accordingly by answering questions or updating the knowledge base.
The system supports quantification (“give me {a | the | some | all | any | n} can”), thematic roles (action-specific predi-
cates that qualify the actions), interactive disambiguation (the robot asks questions when it needs more information), and 
anaphora resolution (“give it to me”) based on the dialogue history and the working memory. It also supports knowledge ex-
tension by learning new semantic structures. For instance, a sentence like “learn that cats are animals” is converted into 〈Cat 
subClassOf Animal〉 and added to the knowledge base after checking for possible contradictions with existing knowledge.
Dialogs finally interprets common temporal and spatial adverbs (like above or tomorrow) and translates simple expressions 
of internal state into experiences (for instance, “I’m tired” is processed into 〈HUMAN1 experiences STATE1, STATE1 hasFea-
ture tired〉, see also Section 3.5.2). A full account of the Dialogs features and the corresponding algorithms is available 
in [74].
3.3.2. Dialogue and multi-modality
Because all of the components of our architecture rely on the same RDF formalism to represent their outputs, the 
different communication modalities are presented in a homogeneous way, as symbolic statements in the knowledge base. 
This applies both to explicit modalities (verbal communication, deictic gestures, gaze focus), and implicit modalities (like 
the body position of the human). The dialogue grounding process makes use of them at two distinct levels to provide 
multi-modal concept grounding.
First, specific steps of the grounding process explicitly check for the presence and value of certain facts. For instance, 
when several instances match a category (the human says “give me the bottle” and the robot knows about three bottles), 
the module may decide to discard some of the candidates based on their visibility for the speaker (implicit communication 
context taking into account the human position). In this particular case, the heuristic is selected by Dialogs based on the 
quantifier preceding the class (“give me the bottle”). The first study (Section 4.1) illustrates the details of this process.
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generated (human actions at the top, robot actions at the bottom, PUTRV stands here for Put it so it is both Reachable and Visible). The arrow between the 
two streams represents a synchronisation point between the robot and the human based on a causal link.
As another example, when the human says “this”, the robot checks if the human is currently pointing at an object. In 
that case, this is replaced by the object focused on. Otherwise, the robot performs anaphora resolution by looking up in the 
dialogue history to find a previous concept that the user could refer to.
Note that while the system benefits from complementary modalities, they are not all required. The system can run with 
the verbal modality alone, at the cost of a simpler interaction. For example, if the human says “this” without the robot 
tracking what the human points at, no 〈HUMAN1 pointsAt ...〉 fact is possibly available in the knowledge base, and the 
robot falls back on the anaphora resolution step alone.
The second level of integration of multi-modality is implicit. By continuously computing symbolic properties from the 
geometric model, richer symbolic descriptions are available to the system to verbalise or discriminate entities. For instance, 
the robot may compute that one bottle is next to a glass, while another one stands alone. These symbolic descriptions are 
transparently re-used in a dialogue context to generate unambiguous references to discriminate between similar objects: “do 
you mean the bottle that is next to the glass?”. The physical context of the interaction is used as an implicit communication 
modality by Dialogs. Ros et al. [17] provides a detailed account of our approach to interactive concept clarification and 
discrimination, along with the related algorithms.
3.4. Human-aware task planning
Whenever necessary, the execution controllers rely on symbolic task planning to convert long-term desires into a set of 
partially ordered elementary actions. This is the role of the HATP planner (Human Aware Task Planner) [75–77].
The HATP planning framework extends the traditional Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) planning domain representation 
and semantics by making them more suitable to produce plans which involve humans and robots acting together toward 
a joint goal. HATP is used by the robot to produce human–robot shared plans [78–80] which are then used to anticipate 
human action, to suggest a course of action to humans, or possibly to ask help from the human if needed.
The HATP planning domain defines a set of methods describing how to incrementally decompose a task and to allocate 
subtasks and actions to the robot and/or the human depending on the context. This represents the procedural knowledge 
of the robot as well as its knowledge about the actions that the human partner is able to achieve. It is stored outside of the 
central knowledge base, using a specific formalism (see the related discussion at the end of this section).
We discuss next how HATP incrementally builds and synchronises streams of actions for each or the agents (humans 
and robot) involved in a task, and how it promotes plans that satisfy humans needs and preferences as well as comfort and 
legibility.
3.4.1. Agents and action streams
The originality of HATP resides in its ability to produce shared plans which might involve the robot as well as the other 
participants.
HATP treats agents as “first-class entities” in the domain representation language. It can therefore distinguish between 
the different agents in the domain as well as between agents and the other entities such as tables and chairs. This enables 
a post-processing step that splits the final solution (sequence of actions) into two (or more if there are several humans) 
synchronised solution streams, one for the robot and one for the human, so that the streams may be executed in parallel 
and synchronised when necessary (Fig. 8).
This effectively enriches the interaction capabilities of the robot by providing the system with what is in essence a 
prediction of the human behaviour. This prediction is used by the robot execution controller to monitor the engagement of 
the human partner during plan achievement.
The planner also generates causal links and synchronisation points between the robot and his human partners. For 
instance, in the plan depicted in Fig. 8, the human needs to wait for the success of the robot’s action PUTRV. The robot 
monitors the success of its own action (by checking for the fulfilment of the action post-conditions; in this particular case 
〈HUMAN sees BOTTLE〉 and 〈HUMAN canReach BOTTLE〉) to estimate what and when the human is likely to perform his next 
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action (here, TAKE(BOTTLE, TABLE)). This, in turn, allows the robot to monitor the human engagement and the progress 
in the shared plan execution. A complete example is presented in Section 4.1
The hierarchical structure of the shared plans obtained through the HTN refinement process provide a good basis for 
plan verbalisation. Upon request, it allows the robot to explain to its human partner how a task can be shared [12,14].
3.4.2. Action costs and social rules
A duration and a cost function are associated to each action. The duration function provides a duration interval for the 
action achievement. It serves both to schedule the different streams and as an additional cost function. Besides time and 
energy consumption, the cost function integrates factors that measure the satisfaction of the human in terms of acceptability 
and legibility of the resulting robot behaviour.
HATP includes mechanisms called social rules to promote plans that are considered as suitable for human–robot interac-
tion. The following constraints can be set:
Wasted time: avoids plans where the human spends a lot of her time being idle;
Effort balancing with respect of human desires: avoids plans where efforts are not distributed among the agents taking part 
to the plan, respective of the human preferences. It is indeed sometimes beneficial to balance efforts between the human 
and the robot. Sometimes the human wants to do more, or on the contrary, prefers to leave the robot do most of the work;
Simplicity: promotes plans that limit as much as possible the interdependencies between the actions of agents involved 
in the plan, as an issue during the execution of one of those actions would put the entire plan at risk. Also intricate 
human–robot activity may cause discomfort since the human will find herself repeatedly in a situation where she is waiting 
for the robot to act;
Undesirable sequences: avoids plans that violate specific user-defined sequences (for instance sequences which can be 
misinterpreted by the human).
Combining the above criteria, we yield shared plans with desirable interaction features like having the human engaged 
in a number of tasks while her overall level of efforts remains low, or avoiding having the human to wait for the robot by 
preventing the action streams from having too many causal links between them.
Fig. 9 illustrates such a socially-optimised plan where the no wasted time social rule is applied: compared to the plan 
depicted in Fig. 8, the robot first moves the bottle so that the human can immediately take it and put it into the bin, thus 
reducing the human idle time.
In the current implementation, the social rules are effectively implemented as filters applied to the set of all possible 
plans computed by the planner. In the future, we intend to extend the plan-search algorithm and integrate the social rules 
in the process itself.
As HATP is a generic symbolic task planner and does not enforce any abstraction level for the planning domain, we 
have designed a planning domain made of top-level tasks whose semantics are close to the one used in the human–robot 
dialogue: the planner domain effectively contains concepts like Give, table, isOn. This leads to an effective mapping 
between the knowledge extracted from the situation assessment or the dialogue, and the planner.
Due to expressiveness issues, we do not represent the planning domain (i.e., the set of tasks with their pre- and 
post-conditions) in the knowledge base directly (see appendix B of [81] for the full rationale). This effectively leads to 
independent declarative (the Oro knowledge base) and procedural (the planner) knowledge stores.
3.5. Robot execution control
While parts of the architecture (Spark, Oro) have been deployed with external execution controllers (like Cram [32] or 
the BERT platform [82], as reported in [28]), we have also developed dedicated robot controllers which integrate into the 
deliberative architecture introduced in Fig. 2. Shary [83] is the main one, written in the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS)
language [84]. We have also developed the Python-based pyRobots [85] that provides a large set of high-level actions and 
an event-based architecture well suited for prototyping. They both rely on extensive integration with the knowledge base, 
that serves as the primary source of semantics for the decision making process.
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context-based refinement and execution of actions, as well as monitoring of those achieved by its human partner. One of 
the key design goals is to build such abilities in a generic way, and to provide several levels of parametrisation allowing 
to adapt to various environments and various levels of involvement of the robot, ranging from teammate behaviour to 
assistant or proactive helper. Based on this, the robot controller invokes the adequate human-aware planners and react to 
events triggered by the Oro knowledge base (as described below).
Execution control systems for social robots are expected to account not only for the task achievement but also for the 
communication and monitoring acts needed to support human–robot interactive task achievement [86,87,5]. Shary supports 
as well such a mechanism [88]. It allows to bind action execution to communication policies in order to produce multi-modal 
signals towards the human and to react to human actions and signals. The communication act is the central concept in this 
formalism. It represents an information exchange between the two agents and plays the role of a transition condition. This 
exchange can be realised through speech, through an expressive motion or a combination of the two. It enables the robot 
as well as the human to communicate their beliefs about the task to be achieved, in order to share mutual knowledge and 
to synchronise their activities. This is done through real-time task-based situation assessment achieved by the combination 
of Shary monitoring processes and Oro inference mechanisms. In Shary, each action description contains not only how to 
execute it and monitor it, but also how to initiate it (e.g. in the case of a shared action, how both agents need to commit 
to the task) and how to suspend (or cancel) it. In each of these cases, the action description also makes explicit how the 
transition has to be communicated to the human partner if necessary. This is supported by a description of the beliefs of 
each of the agents regarding the action achievement process, as well as a set of so-called monitoring processes that update 
them.
Two recent developments have further improved the robot’s ability to adapt to human action, both at the action level 
and at the plan level. In [89], an extension is proposed for the system to estimate the intentions of the human during 
collaborative tasks using POMDP models. The controller adjusts then appropriately the chosen set of actions. In [13], the 
controller is complemented with a framework that allows the robot to estimate the mental state of the human partner, not 
only related to the environment but also related to the state of goals, plans and actions. They are then accounted for by the 
execution controller.
3.5.1. Event-driven control
The Oro server supports two paradigms to access its content: RPC-style queries (based on the standard SPARQL language) 
or events. A module can subscribe to an event by registering an event pattern (in its simplest form, a partial statement like 
〈? type Book〉) and a callback. Each time a new instance of a book appears in the knowledge base, the callback is triggered.
This allows us to write reactive robot controllers with a high level of expressiveness: for instance, by subscribing to the 
event 〈HUMAN1 desires ?action, ?action type Give, ?action actsOnObject ?obj, ?obj type Book〉, we effectively trig-
ger a behaviour when the human expresses (through dialogue, gestures...) that he wants the robot to give her a book.
The robot controller designer does not need to directly care about how this desire is produced (this is delegated to 
perception modules), he can instead focus on the semantics of the desire.
Note that we transparently take advantage of the reasoning capabilities of the system to trigger event to trigger events: 
for example, the type of the object (〈?obj type Book〉) may not be explicitly asserted, but inferred by the reasoner based on 
other assertions.
3.5.2. Complying with human desires and experiences
We divide the interaction situations perceived from the situation assessment and the communication components into 
two categories: desires (related to performative acts in Austin’s classification of speech acts [90]) and experiences.
Desires are typically human commands (“Give me that book”). The nature of the desired action (to pick, to give, to look, 
to bring, to show...), along with the action parametrisation (thematic roles) are fetched by the execution controller in the 
knowledge base, and are either sent as goals to the task planner, or executed if the elementary action is directly available.
Experiences, on the other hand, comprise of emotions, states and questions (when asking a question, we consider the 
human to be in an interrogative state). When the knowledge base states that an agent experiences a particular emotion or 
state, the execution controller may decide to handle it, typically by trying to answer the question or using the emotional or 
physical state as a parameter for subsequent actions. As an example, when the speaker says “I feel tired”, we change the 
motion planner parametrisation to lower the effort the human needs to provide for the following joint manipulation tasks.6
3.5.3. Human-aware action refinement
Before being executed, elementary actions are further refined by the execution controller with the help of a set of 
dedicated human-aware geometric motion planning functions provided by a component called Mhp (see architecture in 
Fig. 2).
These functions are designed to plan navigation [91] and manipulation [92,93] paths not only safe but also comfortable 
and socially acceptable by reasoning explicitly on human’s kinematics, vision field, posture and preferences [94–96]. They 
6 Note that this specific example has been implemented as a proof-of-concept. A broader framework that would support action alteration based on the 
user’s experienced states remains to be investigated.
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Main studies conducted with our cognitive architecture.
Study Focus Reference
Point & Learn (2010) Interactive knowledge acquisition [28]
Spy Game (2010) Interactive object discrimination [17]
Interactive Grounding I (2011) Multi-modal interaction, perspective taking [98]
Roboscopie (2011) Human–Robot theatre performance [99]
Cleaning the table (2011) Complete architecture integration [100]
I’m in your shoes (2012) False beliefs [45]
Give me this (2012) Natural joint object manipulation [101]
Interactive Grounding II (2012) Multi-modal interaction, perspective taking [102]
Fig. 10. A scenario involving multi-modal, interactive grounding: the humans can refer to invisible or ambiguous objects that the robots anchor to physical 
objects through multi-modal interactions with the user.
also provide routines to compute spatial placements for robot and objects that obey constraints related to the interaction, 
like optimal mutual reachability or optimal visibility [97].
Finally, when an action requires the motion of both the human and the robot, Mhp can plan for both of them in order 
for the robot to take the lead by automatically computing where the interaction might preferably take place [3,4]. This can 
effectively smoothen the interaction by off-loading a part of the cognitive load of the interaction from the human to the 
robot. As such, this is the geometric counterpart of the HATP symbolic task planner: it is able to make use of a set of social 
rules to adapt geometric plans to social interactions.
4. Support studies
Our architecture has been deployed and tested in a number of studies on several robotic platforms. Table 3 lists the most 
significant ones, with their main focuses and reference publications.
We present here elements of two of them in order to illustrate in a practical way the different aspects of the architecture. 
The first one is focused on knowledge representation and verbal interaction: the human asks for help to find and pack 
objects (Interactive Grounding I in Table 3). The second one (Cleaning the table) involves the Shary execution controller and 
the HATP symbolic task planner. In this scenario, the human and the robot need to cooperatively remove objects from a 
table. Robot behaviours and motions are fully planned and then executed.
4.1. Interactive grounding
This first study is based on a “home move” backstory: two users are moving their belongings to a different home, and 
need the help of a robot to pack. Jido, a single-arm mobile manipulator, is observing while they carry over boxes (Fig. 10), 
and answers questions concerning the location of specific objects. This study focuses on multi-modal, interactive grounding 
only: the robot observes, builds and maintains knowledge about its human partners perspectives and affordances but does 
not actually perform any physical action besides verbal interaction and simple head movements.
Objects are perceived through 2D fiducial markers attached to them, and humans are tracked through motion capture. 
The robot knowledge base is initialised with the Oro commonsense ontology. We next describe two situations where we 
can follow the internal robot’s reasoning and the interaction with the user.
Implicit disambiguation through visual perspective taking. User A enters the room while carrying a large box (Fig. 10(a)).
He approaches the table and asks Jido to hand him over a video tape: “Jido, can you give me the video tape”. The
Dialogs module processes this sentence, and queries the ontology to identify the object the human is referring to:
find(?obj type VideoTape).
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Two video tapes are visible to the robot: one on the table, and another one inside the cardboard box. The knowledge 
base returns both: ?obj = [BLACK_TAPE, WHITE_TAPE].
However, only one is visible to User A (the one on the table). Although there is an ambiguity from the robot’s perspective, 
the human referred to the video tape using the definite quantifier the: this is interpreted by the natural language processor 
as the human referring to a known object, i.e. the one visible in the human’s knowledge model.7
Explicit disambiguation through verbal interaction and gestures. In the second situation, User B enters the room without know-
ing where User A had moved the video tapes (Fig. 10(b)). He first asks Jido: “What’s in the box?”. The robot first needs 
to ground the word “box”. Similar to the previous situation, two boxes are visible: find(?obj type Box) ⇒ ?obj = 
[CARDBOARD_BOX, TOOLBOX]
However both are visible to the human and the previous ambiguity resolution procedure can not be applied. The robot 
generates a question (using the Discrimination algorithm, Section 3.1.1) and asks User B which box he is referring to by 
verbalising the following question: “Which box, the toolbox or the cardboard box?” User B could answer the question, but 
he instead decides to point at it: “This box” (Fig. 10(b)). Spark identifies the CARDBOARD_BOX as being pointed at, as well 
as looked at, by the human and updates the ontology with this new information. The reasoner applies a rule available in 
the common-sense ontology 〈pointsAt(?ag, ?obj) ∧ looksAt(?ag, ?obj) → focusesOn(?ag, ?obj)〉. The Dialogs module 
merges both sources of information, verbal (“this”) and deictic, by issuing a query to the knowledge base that eventually 
lifts the ambiguity:
find(?obj type Box; USER_B focusesOn ?obj)
⇒ ?obj = [CARDBOARD_BOX]
Finally, Dialogs queries the ontology about the content of the box and the question can be answered: “Wall-E” (the label 
of the object had been statically asserted in the ontology at start-up).
At this point User B wants to know where is the other tape: “And where is the other tape?”. Dialogs is able to convert 
“the other tape” into a new query using the differentFrom OWL predicate:
〈?obj type VideoTape〉
〈?obj differentFrom WHITE_TAPE〉
⇒ ?obj = [BLACK_TAPE]
Since there is only one possible “other” videotape, no specific disambiguation is required. The referent is uniquely iden-
tified and Dialogs can then query for its location: find(BLACK_TAPE isAt ?loc). The robot finally verbalises the result 
〈BLACK_TAPE isOn table, BLACK_TAPE isNextTo TOOLBOX〉 into “The other tape is on the table and next to the toolbox.”
4.2. Collaborative task planning
This second study demonstrates a richer decision-making process where the Oro server is used in conjunction with the 
HATP symbolic task planner and the Shary execution controller to produce and execute a shared plan. The task consists in 
cooperatively cleaning a table by moving objects into their target bins (Fig. 11).
Fig. 12 walks through a simplified version of the whole task. It depicts a run with a single video tape on a table. The 
video tape is reachable by the robot only, while the bin (where the objects are supposed to be eventually moved to) is 
reachable by the human only: the robot needs to come up with a shared plan that involves a joint action.
7 Other heuristics are available to the Dialogs module: for instance, if a tape had been recently mentioned in the dialogue, this instance would have 
been selected instead as the referent.
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The goal is first received by the execution controller (after processing of the user request by the Dialogs module, not 
shown on the figure). At t1 in Fig. 12, the video tape is computed by the robot as being reachable by the robot only (columns 
Perception and Knowledge), and the execution controller invokes the task planner, which produces a joint plan (column Plan) 
to move the tape so that the human can pick it and drop it into the bin.
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〈GREY_TAPE isOn TABLE〉 must be true), and calling the 3D motion planner (column Actions, left). The motion planner returns 
two elementary actions (PICK_GOTO followed by TAKE_TO_FREE) that the controller executes (by first reaching for the 
object, grasping it and bringing it back to a free position). The robot’s perception monitors the evolution of the scene until 
the task’s post-conditions are verified (at t2, by satisfying the statement 〈ROBOT hasInHand TAPE〉), and the next task is then 
started (placing the tape so that it is reachable to the human).
At t3, the video tape is now reachable to the human, and the next tasks (taking the tape and placing it in the bin) have 
to be performed by the human: the robot instructs the user to do so (verbal interaction not represented on the figure) and 
monitors the actions of the human to detect when the tasks’ post-conditions are satisfied (column Actions, right). When 
these post-conditions are fulfilled, the goal is considered to be achieved.
This example illustrates how the symbolic facts are produced by the situation assessment module Spark, and, in parallel, 
used by the execution controller to assess the overall progress of the plan.
5. Discussion: when artificial intelligence enables human–robot interaction
The previous sections provide a perspective on a complete deliberative architecture for social robots, including its im-
plementation, supported by experimental deployments. This section synthesises what we see as the main challenges that 
human–robot interaction brings to Artificial Intelligence. We first discuss how embodied cognition is an essential challenge 
in human–robot interaction; we rephrase then the requirements of joint actions in terms of five questions; we discuss the 
importance of building and maintaining a multi-level model of the human; and we finally reflect on the importance of 
explicit knowledge management in robotic architectures that deal with human-level semantics and state in that respect the 
current limits of our logic framework.
5.1. Embodied cognition
Robotics is traditionally regarded as the prototypical instance of embodied artificial intelligence, and this dimension is 
especially prevalent in human–robot interaction, where the robot has to share and collaborate in a joint physical environ-
ment. This leads to a tight coupling between the symbolic and the geometric realms: while AI at its origins was mostly 
concerned with symbolic models, it has been since recognised that not only the mind is not a purely abstract system, 
disconnected from the physical world, but even more, cognition fundamentally relies on its relation to the physical world 
(so-called embodied cognition). Varela [103] is one of the main discoverer of these mechanisms, and coined the concept of 
enactivism as the theoretical framework that studies the links between cognition, embodiment and actions. This has since 
been thoroughly studied in robotics and artificial intelligence (Pfeifer and Bongard [104] is one of the reference).
The challenge of symbol grounding is also tightly linked to this issue. It corresponds to the identification or creation, and 
then, maintenance of a link between the symbol (the syntactic form of knowledge that the computer manipulates) and its 
semantics (its meaning, anchored in the world). The relation between the symbol, the referent of the symbol, and mediating 
minds is classically referred as the semantic triangle and has been extensively studied in linguistics. The issue of grounding 
is well known in cognitive science and is summarised by Harnad [11] by this question: “how the semantic interpretation of 
a formal symbol system can be made intrinsic to the system?”. This issue has a major practical importance in robotics: for 
a robot to be both endowed with a symbolic representational and reasoning system, and able to act in the physical world, 
it must ground its knowledge.
As we have seen, grounding is implemented at different levels in our architecture. The main source of grounded symbolic 
knowledge is the situation assessment module, Spark. It builds symbolic facts from spatial reasoning, and also relies on 
(limited) temporal reasoning to track the world state and build explanations to interpret unexpected perceptions (like an 
object that suddenly disappears). Because Spark also tracks humans, which enables perspective-aware spatial reasoning, it 
can produce as well grounded symbolic knowledge for the agents it interacts with. This is a typical embodied cognitive skill.
Grounding also occurs during verbal and non-verbal communication. The Dialogs module grounds new concepts intro-
duced by the speaker by asking questions until it can attach the new concept to concepts already present in the knowledge 
pool (if one asks the robot “bring me a margarita”, the robot may initially asks “what is a margarita?”. The user would 
answer “a cocktail” and the robot would continue the grounding – “what is a cocktail?” – until it anchors the new concept 
to ones it already knows like Drink). Embodied interactions (like gestures) are also taken into account at this level: we 
have presented how pointing, for instance, is used by the robot to ground “this” or “that” to the pointed artifact.
Note that, because only objects marked with 2D fiducial markers are currently recognised (typically, about ten of them 
are simultaneously used in a given experiment), our grounding mechanisms have only been exercised in small-sized closed 
world. This simplifies the task, and we can not claim that our approach provides a generic grounding capability. Context, cul-
tural background, “naive physics” knowledge, emotional state of the human are some of the numerous determinants beyond 
the perception of geometric entities. They would need to be accounted for when grounding human–robot interaction.
5.2. The W-questions of joint action
Our context, where a robot has to achieve a task together with humans, raises another set of specific issues to be tackled 
by the robot’s decisional components. We summarise them as the “W-questions”: What, Who, When, Where and How?
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long term goals, is the basic question for an intelligent robot. It is made more complex here by having to deal with the 
partially observable physical and mental state of the human partner, and by the extended set of possible actions.
Who should act now is of key importance and also needs to be decided upon by the robot. It is sometimes expected as an 
intelligent behaviour for the robot to wait and let its human partner act instead. Correct management of turn-taking leads 
to various decisional challenges.
When to perform a given action is made more complex by the presence of humans. The robot has to take into account her 
needs, her rhythms and pace, and her mental state. While performing its share of the task, the robot has to produce signals 
directed towards the human and to respond to signals produced back at the proper pace to ensure collaboration.
Where to perform an action plays an important role as well: the choice is not trivial and might need elaborated decision. 
The robot is expected to take into account effort sharing, visibility of its action by the human, disturbance or discomfort 
induced by its action.
How to perform an action, finally, needs to be reflected upon by the robot: several options to perform an action or to 
achieve a goal are often available, and selecting one is a non-trivial decision problem. Cost-based planners augmented with 
social rules are one possible approach: they search for plans that satisfy an acceptable cost in terms of acceptability or 
legibility as well.
These five questions should not be considered independently from each other and often require, on the contrary, to 
be dealt with in a single decision step. The human-aware task and motion planners which we have built are instances of 
systems which have been designed to deal with such intricate decision issues.
They are in fact considered in each of the components, at different levels of abstraction (from the abstract shared plan 
level to the action refinement and execution level). At every interaction step, the choice of the next action, of who has 
to act (the human, the robot or both of them) and when to perform it is made by Shary with the help of HATP, based 
on perspective-taking and situation assessment (Spark and Oro), as well as on the estimation of the human mental state 
(Shary with the help of Oro). The actual realisation of the action is eventually supported by a full set of on-line planning 
functions provided by Mhp that computes not only trajectories but also the pertinent placements and postures based not 
only on geometric information but also estimation of the human current mental state and preferences (Oro).
5.3. Putting the humans into equations
The correlate of these five W-questions is the issue the human models: taking appropriate decisions with and in presence 
of humans requires appropriate models of the human: what the human can do, would like to do, knows, could infer, etc.
While the task of describing all the (dynamic) human models that are useful to robots is immense (if doable at all), 
we claim that it is possible to devise and use such models in limited, but still interesting and useful, contexts such as 
collaborative human–robot objects manipulation, fetch-and-carry and associated activities in home or work environments.
In our architecture, perspective taking, for instance, is tightly connected to the symbolic knowledge models, and since 
our knowledge base allows for storage of one knowledge model per agent, we have been able to endow the robot with a 
simple theory of mind (as explained in section 3.1.2): we explicitly model what the robot knows about its partners in a 
symbolic way. This knowledge is then re-used in different places, to correctly interpret what the human says, or to plan 
tasks that are actually doable for the human.
The cognitive model that the robot builds for the agents it interacts with remains today simple and mostly focused on 
geometric features and affordances (who sees what? what are our relative positions? what is reachable to whom?). Extending this 
knowledge with more subtle perceptions (emotional state for instance) remains to be explored beyond simple examples like 
the processing of explicit verbal statements like “I’m tired!” (Section 3.5.2).
Motion and action execution also requires human models, and the one we use embeds human preferences and physical 
constraints that need to be accounted for when synthesising robot motion or producing robot plans. This includes proxemics 
(human–robot distance) and associated issues (visibility) but also legibility and acceptability criteria expressed in terms of 
social rules that the produced plans should satisfy.
5.4. Explicit knowledge for social robotics
As thoroughly presented in this article, we have built the decisional capabilities of our robots around this idea of explicit 
knowledge manipulation.
Explicit knowledge in our architecture. The components that we have presented so far build a knowledge-oriented architecture: 
knowledge is explicitly stored in one central and consistent repository of facts, accessible to all modules. It relies on a strict 
formalism (OWL statements), with a well defined vocabulary (stated in the common-sense ontology). These first two points 
lead to a loosely-coupled architecture where modules can be removed or replaced by other ones as long as they share the 
same semantics: modules are defined by the knowledge they produce or consume.
Also, we adopt a symbolic, hybrid (reactive and planning-based), event-driven approach to robot control. By managing 
events at the same level as the reasoner, we take full advantage of the inference abilities of Oro to trigger events whose
true conditions can be (possibly indirectly) inferred using human-level semantics.
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mutual benefits to components. For instance, the dialogue processing module can run without any situation assessment, but 
its disambiguation routines can transparently benefit from it when available (since richer symbolic descriptions of objects 
are then available).
We want to underline the shift of focus brought by this approach during the design and integration phases of robots: 
components of our deliberative layer are defined and bound together by the knowledge they produce and consume. Human–
robot interaction, because it supposes operations at human level and in environments with complex semantics, acts here as 
a motivational force.
Limits of disambiguation at semantic level. Interaction with humans implies the ability to deal with semantics: semantics of 
verbal interaction, semantics of gestures, etc. As a consequence, it also implies to deal with semantic disambiguation.
We have studied a prototypical example of semantic disambiguation in [17] with the children’s “spygame”: two players 
are facing each other with a set of random objects in-between, one player mentally choose one object, and the other player 
has to guess the object by asking closed questions like Is your object small or large? Based on the knowledge it has acquired, 
the robot is able to minimise the number of questions required to find the object.
When playing this kind of game, however, the issue arises that the robot has no way to select which knowledge about the 
object is relevant in the interaction context. For instance, the knowledge base may store facts like 〈OBJ1 type ActiveCon-
cept〉 (which internally means that this concept was mentioned in a discussion in the last few seconds): this information 
is not a relevant property of OBJ1 when trying to disambiguate concepts with humans. This distinction between internal 
knowledge (meaningful to the system only) and common knowledge (whose meaning is understood by all the agents) has not 
been properly dealt with in our architecture.
Besides, even knowledge that belongs to the common knowledge may not be appropriate in a given interaction context. 
For instance, the system may compute that at a given instant the human is looking at the object: 〈HUMAN looksAt OBJ1〉. This 
property makes sense to both parties, but in the context of the spygame, we would like to mainly use immanent properties, 
not volatile like a gaze. More research is required to identify relevant interaction contexts and knowledge classes attached 
to them.
6. Conclusion
6.1. A deliberative architecture for social robots
We have presented in this paper an instance of a complete deliberative architecture designed for social robots. While 
most of its sub-components have been independently presented in other publications, we offer here for the first time a 
perspective on the model of integration of these components into a coherent and consistent system for social human–robot 
interaction. We have first exposed our underlying knowledge model based on Description Logics [28] and some of the 
resulting reasoning capabilities pertaining to disambiguation [17] and mental modelling [45] that are shown to effectively 
scaffold interaction using human-level semantics and cognitive skills. We have then presented our approach to symbol 
grounding, build on an amodal situation assessment environment [61] that supports perspective taking [64,67]. We combine 
it further with a situated natural language processor [74] to provide complete multi-modal interactive communication. 
The paper also covers our symbolic social task planner [75–77]: it generates predictive plans of the human actions that 
enable the system to plan for joint human–robot tasks. It can also make use of social heuristics to optimise plans for 
social acceptability. We briefly mention our human-aware motion and manipulation planner [91,105,92,97,93,95], and finally 
present two execution controller, the PRS-based Shary [83,89,2] and the event-driven pyRobots [85].
The integration of these components in a consistent, working and observable system builds upon the particular design 
of the interfaces between the cognitive components: the information streams use high-level semantics, represented as 
first-order logic statements. In that sense, our deliberative architecture is similar to projects like cram [32], KeJia [35] or PEIS 
Ecology [106,39], with however a stronger emphasise on the specificities of the interaction with humans. Importantly, we 
distinguish ourselves from research on cognitive architectures: cognitive architectures are usually understood as an artificial 
yet principled model of (human) cognition. While some have been deployed on autonomous robots, like HAMMER [107] or 
ACT-R/E [22], most are primarily concerned with the modelling of human cognition and are less focused on the effective 
deployment on socially interactive robots. In that sense, our contribution in terms of architecture is a practical one: our 
integration model enables to consistently combine a large set of technically independent yet cognitively interdependent 
cognitive processes. We bridge them through explicit, human-level semantics, and we show that this results in a fully 
implemented system, effectively deployed on several platforms and in several real interaction scenarios.
This work introduces several new contributions related to the representation and the management of humans in an 
autonomous robotic system. Specifically, we mentioned in the introduction the following four points:
• our system achieves multi-modal and interactive grounding in complex real environments involving one or several 
humans and a robot;
• it supports a distributed computation of symbolic knowledge for situated dialogue, thanks to the combination of per-
spective taking, affordances computation and logical inference;
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• and, by reusing the computed affordances and inference, it generates, monitors and takes part to human–robot shared 
plans.
While several contributions in the literature provide insights and contributions on one aspect or another (references 
are in the corresponding subsections), we are not aware of a fully implemented architecture that effectively combines in a 
coherent manner all these points. The novelty and relevance of this contribution to HRI is further underlined by the range 
of multi-disciplinary collaborations and studies that have been made possible by our architecture [15–20].
6.2. The next steps
The design choices and the results presented here are still preliminary. While the general scheme we propose might 
be difficult to implement in a general sense, we believe that it is a reasonable challenge to implement it in the case of a 
personal robot assistant essentially devoted interactive manipulation tasks and associated activities.
One direction that we would like to further investigate is how to account for situations where divergent beliefs appear 
between the human and the robot. Some preliminary results have been presented in [45,108] where we consider divergent 
beliefs about the state of the world, and in [13] where the robot is able to deal with divergent beliefs related to the state 
of the task.
There is also extensive work to be done in order to refine the notion of “good shared plan” and “good/acceptable robot 
behaviour” in this context. There are large avenues for learning and adaptation in this context.
Another direction to head to deals with context representation. Contexts are currently often limited to the current spa-
tial and temporal situation. Some of our models offer the possibility to jump in the past or to switch to another agent’s 
perspective, but in our current approach, selecting a context essentially consists in retrieving a set of beliefs correspond-
ing to a situation, and temporarily replacing the current beliefs by those other ones. This misses the fact that at a given 
moment, not one but many contexts co-exist at different scales. We do not want to retrieve one monolithic set of beliefs, 
but instead carefully craft a context from several atomic contexts. Techniques for representation of overlapping “pools” of 
knowledge largely remain to be developed, as well as efficient algorithms to retrieve (or discard) such context-related pools 
of knowledge. This is a challenge not only for robotics, but more generally for artificial intelligence. The ability to explicitly 
manage contexts and context switches would endow the robot with a cognitive capability similar to what is known as 
context-dependent memory in cognitive psychology. This is also related to Tulving’s autonoetic consciousness [109]: the ability 
to reflect upon its own past or future experiences. Much remain to be done to this regard, starting with a formal analysis 
of what are the relevant contexts for our robots.
Human–Robot Interaction is and will remain a challenging field for Artificial Intelligence. We hope that this contribution 
helps with clarifying these challenges and making them concrete decisional problems.
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